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It is known that discretionary policy may give rise to an inÀationary bias if wages are
negotiated in nominal terms. It has recently been argued that this bias can be eliminated, and
welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about
inÀation (a “populist” central banker). A conceptual Àaw of the latter result is identi¿ed here.
It is shown that when wages are negotiated in nominal terms the result is true only in the
special case of a single, all-encompassing, union. In the more general case of multiple unions,
however, inÀation increases linearly with their number and a populist central bank may turn
out to decrease welfare.
JEL classi¿cation: E5, J5.
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1
Recent contributions have shown that the macroeconomic effects of monetary
institutions may depend on the labor market structure. Among the main variables that
characterize the latter are the number of unions that bargain wages in an independent manner,
the degree of labor substitutability and the unions’a v e r s i o nt oi n À ation. Cukierman and
Lippi (1999) and Guzzo and Velasco (1999) provide models where the effects of central bank
independence on inÀation and employment depend on these labor market features.
2
But the models of Cukierman and Lippi and Guzzo and Velasco (CL and GV henceforth)
produce rather different results. Perhaps the most striking difference is that in GV both
inÀation and employment are at their pareto-optimal level when the central banker does not
care at all about inÀation (what they label a “populist” central banker
3), while this is not true
in general in CL. Given the priority currently attributed to the inÀation goal by most central
banks, the robustness of such a proposition seems relevant.
This paper shows that the source of several differences in the results of the two papers,
among which the proposition concerning the (unconditional) optimality of a populist central
banker, is not in the different underlying models of the economy that are used in these
papers. Rather, it lies in the different assumptions that CL and GV make concerning the wage
bargaining process. Both CL and GV FODLP that the unions’ strategic choice variable is the
QRPLQDO wage, i.e. that each union in the bargaining process sets its nominal wage taking the
nominal wages of the other unions as given, what will be called “nominal wage bargaining”.
4
Despite their claim, however, GV solve their model by implicitly assuming that each union
chooses its nominal wage taking the UHDO not the nominal wages of other unions as given.
4 Ih a v eb e n e ¿ ted from the comments of Ken Rogoff, an anonymous referee and Harald Uhlig. The views
are personal and do not involve the responsibility of the institutions with which the author is af¿liated. E-mail:
lippi@dada.it.
5 See Cukierman and Lippi (1999) for a survey of the literature on labor market structure and monetary
institutions.
6 CL label this type of central banker as “ultra liberal”. Here the more parsimonious terminology of GV is
used.
7 Nominal wage bargaining is an essential ingredient of the credibility problem. If wages were negotiated
in real terms, the inÀation bias would not arise.8
It will be shown that the approach of GV is inconsistent with the assumption of
nominal wage bargaining. Intuitively, the inconsistency occurs because under nominal wage
bargaining a non-atomistic union understands that an increase in its nominal wages UHGXFHV
the other unions’ real wages (since inÀation increases and the other unions’ nominal wages
are constant). GV implicit assumption of FRQVWDQW other unions’ real wages implies that GV’s
“equilibrium” is not, in general, a Nash equilibrium. As a consequence, most of their “results”
are not warranted by their formal analysis.
We reformulate the problem of GV under nominal wage bargaining (Section 2) and
demonstrate that in such a case GV’s results are not an equilibrium (Section 3). The correct
Nash equilibrium of the game is derived in Section 4. It will be shown that under nominal
wage bargaining the GV model produces exactly the same result obtained by CL (Section 5):
a populist central banker maximizes welfare RQO\ if there is a single union. As the number of
unions that take part in the wage bargaining increases, inÀation rises linearly and welfare is
not necessarily maximized. A ¿nal section draws conclusions.
 7KH HOHPHQWV RI WKH *9 PRGHO
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Ap r o ¿ t -maximizing representative ¿rm produces a consumption good (t ) with
technology (GV 2.1) where u￿ is worker ￿s labor input (distributed over the unit interval),
j is the labor substitution elasticity and k is a return to scale parameter. Workers are organized
in ?   unions (indexed by ), each of which has a set of members of measure ?3￿ on
whose behalf it sets nominal wages.
5 Worker ’s utility (L￿) is (GV 2.8) where  and qR are
preference parameters and ￿ and Z are, respectively, ’s consumption and the inÀation rate.
The representative union maximizes the utility of its members T￿ (GV 2.10). The government
objectives (GV 2.15) differ from the individual unions’ objectives because the government
accounts for DOO workers and q} may differ from qR
The demand for labor type  is (GV B.2) where ` and `￿ are the aggregate and
individual real wages, respectively, (GV 2.4) and (GV 2.11) (/￿ is the percent increase in
the QRPLQDO wage of the union to which worker  belongs). The representative worker budget
constraint is (GV 2.9) (dividends (￿ are taken as given). The government, instead, does not
take (￿ as given (GV B.5).
Let the strategic choice variable of union  be the nominal wage growth, /￿c identical
across all of its workers (i.e. /￿ ' /￿( all  5 ). From (GV 2.4) and (GV 2.11) we derive












Equation (1) implies that, in a symmetric equilibrium, union  perceives that its nominal wage




8 GV assume q  5= However, as will become clear later, only when q @4the populist central banker is
unconditionally optimal. Therefore q  4 is assumed here in order to consider the special case of q @4 . They
also assume  5 ^3>4` while  5 +3>4, is assumed here to remove the degenerate corner solutions which arise
when  takes the extreme values of either 3 or 4.10
2.1 7KH UHDFWLRQ IXQFWLRQ RI SROLF\ WR QRPLQDO ZDJHV
At w o -stage game is considered. Nominal wages are set in the ¿rst stage in a Nash game
between the ? unions. In the second stage inÀation is chosen by the government to maximize
(GV 2.15) with respect to Z subject to (GV B.2), (GV B.5), (1) taking nominal wages as
given. The ¿rst order condition of this problem yields the reaction function (GV 3.1). Since
the unions’ strategic choice variable is the nominal wage growth (/￿), we express the reaction
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An important implication of (2) is that a non-atomistic union perceives that the growth of its
nominal wages raises inÀation. The perceived impact effect of /￿ on the inÀation rate, when












2 q} n 
  rEq}c?5Efc (3)
which we label r
7 It appears that the impact effect depends on the central bank inÀation
aversion q} and on the union’s size. This shows the relevance of labor market structure:
atomistic unions (? $4 ) perceive their impact on inÀation is zero. A non-atomistic union,
however, perceives that raising its nominal wages increases the inÀation rate (r:f )a n dt h a t
this increase is smaller the more the central bank is inÀation averse.
 1RPLQDO ZDJH EDUJDLQLQJ YHUVXV *9
GV (on p.1324) claim to solve the unions’ problem under the assumption of nominal
wage bargaining (NWB henceforth): “the union sets the rate of increase of the nominal wages
of its members. [..] In doing so, it takes the nominal wages set by other unions as given”. Let
us verify what the NWB assumption implies for the real wage elasticity of labor demand, a
9 As done in GV the approximations orjZl  @ $l   and orjZ  @ $   are used throughout.
: Equation (3) gives the impact effect of $m on inÀation evaluated DW a V\PPHWULF equilibrium, where all
wages are identical, which implies that the term g
g$m
kU 4
3 +$l  $,gl
l
is zero.11
variable that is key in the determination of equilibrium outcomes (see equations 3.4 and 3.6 in



















Note that this is not the elasticity used by GV (equation 2.13 of the GV paper).
8 Instead, when
the other unions’ real wages (`3￿) are assumed to be invariant to changes in union ￿s nominal






‘3￿ ' j 
jE  k  
E  k?
(5)
which is equal to equation (2.13) of the GV paper. Note that   '  only in the special
cases of a single union or an atomistic labor market (respectively, ? 'or ? $4 ),
because in neither case unions perceive to affect the other unions’ real wages under NWB.
The above demonstrates that GV actually solve the unions’ problem by making each union
choose the nominal wage taking the UHDO (not the nominal) wages of other unions as given.
This assumption is inconsistentwith NWBbecause the increasein the nominalwages of anon-
atomistic union reduces the other unions’ real wages (as inÀation rises and the other unions’
nominal wages are constant).
Since GV assume the unions’ strategic choice variable is the QRPLQDO wage (i.e. they
aim at modelling NWB), the implicit assumption of constant other unions’ real wages implies
that the GV “equilibrium” is not a Nash equilibrium, i.e. the unions’ nominal-wage strategies
they consider are not mutual best responses.
9 Indeed, as shown in the next section, equilibrium
employment and inÀation under NWB are not the ones identi¿ed by GV. As a consequence
their results 1b, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are not warranted by their model (result 1a is the only one that is
correct as it is).
; The real wage elasticity  # under NWB is obtained mapping nominal wage growth (the unions’ strategic
choice variable) into real wage growth, according to:
gorjZm





4￿v.T h i si s
convenient because it makes our results directly comparable to those of GV.
< Technically, this can be seen from the fact that the correct real wage elasticity under NWB is not the one
used by GV (Appendix A), which implies that their ¿rst order condition (3.2) is wrong under NWB in all cases
except when q @4or q $4 .12
It may appear at ¿rst that GV results might be resurrected by assuming they are derived
under the assumption of “real wage bargaining”, i.e. a situation in which the unions’ strategic
choice variable is the UHDO wage. In this case, in fact,  is the correct real wage elasticity
to be used. Unfortunately, however, the “real wage bargaining” assumption is only useful to
resurrect the real outcomes of the model, not the inÀation bias result. The reason is that the
bias disappears from the model if unions bargain real wages, as the central bank cannot affect
employment in such a case. Indeed, under “real wage bargaining”, the equilibrium inÀation
rate is always zero in this model. This makes the GV “results” vacuous for the analysis of the
optimal degree of central bank conservatism.
 (TXLOLEULXP XQGHU QRPLQDO ZDJH EDUJDLQLQJ 1:%







   
l
n  *L}u 'f (6)
which indicates that an increase in the wages of union  has two opposing effects on the
utility of workers: on one hand, it decreases utility since it increases inÀation and reduces
consumption (the ¿rst and second terms in (6), respectively). On the other hand, it increases
utility since it raises leisure. Equation (6) shows that union  trades off these marginal bene¿ts
and costs according to its preferences about inÀation, consumption and leisure (qR and ).
Equilibrium outcomes under NWB are obtained combining the reaction function (GV






  5 Efc (7)
where f      
E  kErq}
qRrnE k Erq} 
 (8)13
which is the equilibrium employment level under NWB.
10 InÀation under NWB is also
generally different from that derived in GV (see equation GV 3.6). Equation (7) and (GV










 5HYLVLWLQJ WKH FDVH IRU D SRSXOLVW FHQWUDO EDQNHU
With a populist central banker (q} 'f ) each union perceives its impact on inÀation is
equal to r ' ￿






Equation (10) shows that, as in GV, under a populist CB employment is at its optimal level,
i.e. the level where the consumption/leisure marginal rate of substitution ( *L}u) equals the
(ef¿cient) technical rate of transformation (*k). The intuitive reason is that such banker
would originate an in¿nite inÀation if employment was below the optimal level (k
￿). In order
to avoid such a catastrophe, inÀation averse unions (qR : f) set real wages consistently with
the optimal employment level.





This result is in stark contrast with the one of GV, where the populist central bank produces
]HUR inÀation at all ?’s. Under NWB, this occurs only if there is a single union (? ' ). There
is an intuitive reason for why this happens. When ? ' , the single union does not perceive
the possibility to increase its real wage above the optimal level (i.e. the level consistent with
43 A comparison of  ! with the corresponding GV variable, ! (their equation 3.4) is not fully appropriate
as the latter is not an equilibrium outcome under NWB (see the previous section). However, since ! is the
equilibrium outcome under “real wage bargaining”, the comparison of  ! with ! contains information on the
employment effects of nominal versus real wage bargaining. Analytical results on this issue are available from
the author upon request.14
the optimal employment in 10) because a unit increase in /￿ is matched by a unit increase
in inÀation (r ' ). Thus the union has no incentive to increase its nominal wage since that
would raise inÀa t i o nw i t hn ob e n e ¿ cial effects in terms of leisure (i.e. real wage).
If there is more than one union in the economy, however, each union perceives that a
unit increase in its nominal wages increases its real wages since inÀation rises by less than
one for one (r	 ). Crucially, inÀation does not jump to in¿nity after a VLQJOH union’s wage
increase, even in the presence of a populist central banker, because the inÀa t i o nc a u s e db yt h i s
wage increase reduces the other unions’ real wages leaving the aggregate real wage (hence
aggregate employment) unchanged, at the level desired by the CB.
11
Since each individual union has an incentive to raise its real wages above the socially
optimal level (a well known coordination failure arising in monopolistic markets), it will do
it. Thus, when ?: cDOO unions increase their nominal wages by identical amounts in a
symmetric equilibrium, which are transformed IXOO\ in inÀation by the populist CB.
Note from equation (11) that inÀation is higher the larger the number of unions in the
economy. This occurs because the smaller each union is, the smaller is the perceived impact
on inÀation (naturally, as each union accounts for a smaller portion of the aggregate nominal
wage). This makes the perceived marginal cost of inÀation decreasing in the number of unions.
Hence the equilibrium nominal wage growth chosen by each union, and therefore equilibrium
inÀation, increase with ?.
12
It should therefore be clear that under NWB the GV result on the optimality of the
populist central banker is unconditionally valid (i.e. valid for any qR : f)o n l yi nt h es p e c i a l
case when ? ' , where both inÀation and employment lie at their optimal levels. As ?
increases, the inÀation rate increases linearly. Therefore, when ?: , the optimal level of
44 Equation (14) reveals that an increase in union m’s wages does not raise the aggregate real wage (employ-
ment) under a populist central bank. Notice the difference with the same case under the GV assumption, under
which each union perceives that an increase in its own wages raises the DJJUHJDWH real wage (since the real wages
of the other unions are unchanged), lowering employment and hence leading to a hyperinÀation.
45 The ¿rst order condition of the representative union (6), when j @3(note that 4 implies  # @  when




 ^  4` . orjO @3
which reveals that inÀation costs are decreasing in q.15
CB inÀation aversion (the optimal q}) depends on workers’i n À ation preferences (qR). For
instance, in a decentralized labor market (high ?)i n À ation will be high under the populist
centralbanker, whichmakesitanimprobablesocialoptimum(i.e. given?citisalwayspossible
to ¿nd a suf¿ciently large  but ¿nite  qR for which a populist central banker is not optimal).
 &RQFOXGLQJ UHPDUNV
Most central banks are concerned with inÀation and in many countries this concern has
beenemphasized and mademoreexplicitin recentyears(seeCukierman, 1998). An inÀuential
interpretation of these facts relies on Rogoff’s (1985) idea that, in the presence of credibility
problems, the government may be better off by delegating monetary policy to a “conservative”
central banker. Guzzo and Velasco (1999) have recently challenged this idea. They argued
that in a standard setup, where unions negotiate nominal wages, the appointment of a populist
central banker (one who does not care at all about inÀation) might completely eliminate the
inÀation bias and increase structural employment.
This paper has shown that the results presented by Guzzo and Velasco are inconsistent
with their maintained assumption of nominal wage bargaining. In such a setup, their
“equilibrium” results are not a Nash equilibrium. We have shown that this conceptual Àaw
impairs most of their results.
In particular, when the GV problem is solved correctly under the assumption of nominal
wage bargaining (as was also the intention in their paper) the welfare effects of the populist
central banker may change radically: with the exception of the special case in which there is
a single all-encompassing union, the optimality of a populist central banker is not robust. It is
shown that if society (i.e. workers) is suf¿ciently interested in inÀation, a conservative central
bank may indeed be welfare improving. This result is almost identical to the one obtained
by Cukierman and Lippi (1999). Overall, this casts serious doubts on Guzzo and Velasco’s
normative implication that central banks should not be concerned with price stability.$SSHQGLFHV
APPENDIX A: The real wage elasticity of labor demand
Using the real wage elasticity de¿nition and equation (GV B.2), straightforward algebra
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Since the wage is the same for all workers of union  (label this `￿), and within the group of
the workers belonging to “other unions” (i.e. all `￿ for which  5 c label this `3￿), we can




















































































Substituting (14) into (12) yields (4) in the main text, which in terms of the basic model









The real wage elasticity of GV (their equation 2.13) is obtained from (13) when the
rightmost term in the square bracket, which represents the impact of union  nominal wages
on the other unions’ real wages, is set to zero.
APPENDIX B: A typical union’s ¿rst order condition
















with respect to /￿ subject to (GV 2.9), (GV B.2), (2) and taking /3￿ and (￿ as given. The



















Since the wages of union ￿s members are identical we can integrate across them to get
k













/3￿  qRZr 'f (16)
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(16) by   r yields equation (6) in the main text (the ¿rst order condition for the special case
in which r 'is derived in footnote 10).5HIHUHQFHV
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